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Article 3

Eminent Domain and the Police Power
By T. D. HAVRAW
Generally speaking, private property can only be taken,
or appropriated for public use through the exercise of the
right of eminent domain. The state, however, is not limited
to this mode of appropriation for it is endowed with 'that
broad regulatory power, the police power, subject to which
all private property is held. Consistent with the brevity of
this discussion-it is the purpose of the writer to set forth
the nature, application, effect, and general distinguishing
features of these powers.
The power of eminent domain is defined as "a right
in the government, acting in the interest of the whole public
to force the owner of the property to sell the same to the
public, from whom his title originally came, and subject to
whose needs it is always held."' This is an inherent power
of the sovereignty. It is not created by the Constitution
but is merely recognized as a necessary power of the state,
the preservation of which is essential to the growth and
welfare "of the community. Being an attribute of the sovereignty the sovereign may grant it to whomsoever it may
think proper and deny it to all others. This is purely a
matter of legislative
discretion, unless it is limited by the
2
Constitution..

As to what property is subject to appropriation by
the state by the exercise of this right of eminent domain we
find that the word "property" as used in the Constitution
is one of the most general import. It extends to every species of right capable of being enjoyed as such upon which
it is practicable to place a money value. It includes all
estates successive in time and all easements, and similar
rights in land, provided they are rights which are capable
of enforcement by the courts as against the owners of the
other interest in the land. It also includes personal property and incorporeal hereditaments, franchises, and other
contracts with the state or its subdivisions. 3
1 Black's Constitutional Law, page 469.
2 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446.
3 Hagerstown v. Groh, 101 Md. 560. 10 R. C. L.. pg. 74.
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We have seen that the taking must be for a public use.
"Taking" under the power of eminent domain may be defined as."entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period and, under the warrant or color of legal
authority; devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or. injuriously affecting it in such a
way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of
'4
all beneficial enjoyment thereof."

As to the meaning of "public use" the authorities are
in conflict. Many would confine it to some actual use oir
enjoyment by the public of the property taken,5 while the
broader view extends it to whatever is of benefit. to any
cohsiderable portion of the public, as regards health, material prosperity, or other welfare.' But whatever distinction may be taken as the degree of utility necessary, it would
seem that the benefit must accrue to the community as a
whole, not merely to a particular individual or class. Although the necessity or expediency of the exercise of the
power lies wholly in the discretion of the legislature, the
question whether the use is public is ultimately one for the
courts, that is, the declaration by the legislature'of a use tc
be public will be given gr~at weight unless it is clearly arbitrary or in excess of the -power.T
The government in the exercise of the right of eminent
domin takes, not the proportionate share which every indi-vidual is bound to contribute in way of taxes for the security
which is afforded by the government, but something over
and above his share, and is therefore bound to return to him
not only the general compensation which it gives to all
persons who pay taxes, but particular compensation for the
property seized. 8 This right to compensation has been recognized by the courts as a fundamental right founded on
natural justice.' The Constitution of the United States in
the Fifth Amendment provides; "nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation." However it is well-established that this provision is exclusively
a restriction upon'the powers of the federal government and
4
5
6
7
8
9

Fruth v. Board of Affairs of City of Charleston, 75 W. Va. 456.
Board of Health of Portage Tp. v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533.
Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray (Mass.) 417.
Walker v. Shasta Power Co. 160 Fed, 856.
Pomeroy's Constitutional Law (3rd Ed.), page 161.
People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Priest, 206 N, Y. 274.

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

not a restraint on the states. 10 But most states have now
adopted similar provisions." It is also settled that a taking
of property for a private use or without just compensation
is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Accordingly since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment there is.a possibility of a federal question arising in
every taking by eminent domain under state authority even
if all the requirements of the Constitution of the state are
held to have been complied with.':'
Considering now the effect of police power on the rights
of property it is generally conceded that all property is
held subject to the general police power of the state so to
regulate and control its use in a proper case as to secure
the general safety, the public welfare, and the peace, good
order and morals of the community. 3 This principle emanates from the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum.non laedas and
to effect its purpose the legislature under the police power
may pass laws regulating the acquisition enjoyment, and
disposition of property,' 4 even though in some respects
these may operate as a restraint on individual freedom or
the use of private property.' 5 Accordingly it has been held
that statutes and ordinances requiring the removal or destruction of property or the isolation of infected persons
when necessary for the protection of the public health do
not violate the Constitutional guarantee of the right of enjoyment of liberty and property because neither the right
to liberty nor the right to property extends to the use of
liberty or property to the injury of others.:'
Police regulations are not a taking under the right of
eminent domain or a deprivation of property without due
process of law and so are not unconstitutional although they
may interfere with private rights without providing for
compensation. The constitutional guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment limiting the taking of private property
without compensation is not a limitation of the exercise of
10 Barron v. Baltimore 7 Peters' R. 243.
11 So. I. & M. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 73 S. W. 463. Lewis, Eminent Domain (3rd Ed).
15-61.
12 Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U. S. 266.
13 People v. Smith, 108 Mich. 527.
14 Cincinnati I. & W. R. Co. v. Connersville. 170 Ind. 816.
15 Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 48.
16 Kirk v. Wyman. 83 So. Carolina 872:
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necessary police powers. 17 Whenever the use and enjoyment of property by the owner is regulated by the police
power or if he is deprived of his property altogether, it is
not taken for public use but rather destroyed in order to
conserve the safety, morals, health, or general welfare of
the public, and in neither case is the owner entitled to compensation for the law either regards his loss as daminum
absque injuria, or considers him sufliciently compensated
by sharing in the general benefits resulting from the exercise of this power.' 8 Such regulations must however be
reasonable, and the legislature cannot under the guise of
police regulations arbitrarily invade private property or
personal rights, the test being found in the answer to the
question whether the regulations made have some real and
substantial relation to the public safety, health or welfare,
and whether that is the end sought. If not, the alleged police regulation is unreasonable and may be held void. It is
for the legislature to determine what regulations are proper
but it is for the courts to determine whether the exercise is
reasonable and if it tends to promote the object of the police power.'19
In comparing the power of eminent domain with that
of police power we note that they resemble each other in
that each power recognizes the superior right of the community against the selfishness of the individual, the former
depriving him of the right to obstruct the public necessity
and convenience by obstinately refusing to part with his
property when needed for public use, the latter preventing
his use of his own property in his own way as against the
general comfort and protection of the public.2 0 The distinction however lies in the fact that in eminent domain the
public welfare is promoted by the actual taking of the
property or some right therein from the owner and transferring it to a public agency to be enjoyed by it as its own,
whereas in police power the public is benefited merely by
the regulation and restriction of the use of the property.
In the exercise of the former right private property is taken
for public use invariably entitling the owner to compensa17
18
19
20

Reiken v. Fuehring, 180 Ind. 382, 885.
Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., 282, Penn. 141.
People v. Winner, 271 IIl. 74.
The People v. The Town of Salem, 20 Micb. 452.
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tion therefor, while police power is usually exerted merely
to regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner,
or if he is deprived outright it is not taken for public use
but rather destroyed in order to promote the general welfare
of the public and in neither case is the owner entitled to
compensation.' The test is whether property is condemned
to promote an affirmative public undertaking or, in other
words, to confer an added benefit to the public; or whether
to prevent harm to an established public interest, a deprivation of property is necessary either in the form of imposition
of expense, or of the actual taking or destruction of property which participates in causing a public detriment. 22 As
C. J. Agnew has said, "these distinctions clearly mark the
cases distant from the border line between the two powers,
but in or near to it they begin to fade into each other and
it is difficult
to say when compensation becomes a duty and
' 23
when not.

21 City of Belleville v. St. Clair County Turnpike Co.. 234 I1.
22 Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Penn. St. 80. 85.
23 See note 22.
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